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ABSTRACT
Externalities play a central role in most theories of economic growth. We argue that international
externalities, in particular, are essential for explaining a number of empirical regularities about
growth and development. Foremost among these is that many countries appear to share a common
long run growth rate despite persistently different rates of investment in physical capital, human
capital, and research. With this motivation, we construct a hybrid of some prominent growth models
that  have  international  knowledge  externalities.  When  calibrated,  the  hybrid  model  does  a
surprisingly good job of generating realistic dispersion of income levels with modest barriers to
technology adoption. Human capital and physical capital contribute to income differences both
directly (as usual), and indirectly by boosting resources devoted to technology adoption. The model
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If ideas are the engine of growth and if an excess of social over private returns is an 
essential feature of the production of ideas, then we want to go out of our way to introduce 
external effects into growth theory, not try to do without them. 
 
                                                                                                   Robert E. Lucas (2002, p. 6)  
 
1. Introduction  
A number of facts suggest that international knowledge externalities are critical for 
understanding growth and development.  The growth slowdown that began in the early 
1970s was world-wide, not an OECD-only phenomenon.  Countries with high investment 
rates exhibit higher income levels more than higher growth rates.  Country growth rate 
differences are not very persistent from decade to decade, whereas differences in country 
incomes and investment rates are highly persistent.  These patterns hold for investment 
rates in physical, human, and research capital.  Together, they suggest that investment rates 
affect country transitional growth rates and long run relative incomes rather than long run 
growth rates.  They also suggest countries are subject to the same long run growth rate.  We 
argue that this represents evidence of very large international spillovers at the heart of the 
long run growth process. 
We organize this chapter as follows.  In Section 2 we describe two broad types of 
externalities and the growth models that do (and do not) feature them.  Section 3 presents 
cross-country evidence that, we argue, is very hard to reconcile with the models that have 
no international externalities.  Section 4 calibrates a model of growth with international 
externalities in the form of technology diffusion.  The implied externalities are huge.  
Section 5 concludes and points out directions for future research. 
 
2.  A Brief Guide to Externalities in Growth Models 
In this section we briefly discuss the role that externalities play in prominent 
theories of economic growth.  One class of growth theories features externalities in the 
accumulation of knowledge possessed by firms (organizational capital) or by workers 
(human capital).  Another class of growth models features externalities from the 
introduction of new goods, in the form of surplus to consumers and/or firms.  Other theories 2 
combine knowledge externalities and new good externalities.  Finally, some important 
growth theories include no externalities at all.  Table 1 provides examples of growth models 
categorized in these four ways.  At the end of this section, we will dwell a little on the 
predictions of no-externalities models in order to motivate the evidence we describe in the 
next section.  The evidence in the next section will suggest that models with no externalities 
cannot explain a number of empirical patterns. 
 
2A. Models with Knowledge Externalities 
  Romer (1986) modeled endogenous growth due to knowledge externalities: a given 
firm is more productive the higher the average knowledge stock of other firms.  As an 
example, consider a set of atomistic firms, each with knowledge capital k, benefiting from 
the average stock of knowledge capital in the economy K in their production of output y:   
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Romer showed that, under certain conditions, constant returns to economy-wide 
knowledge, as in this example, can generate endogenous growth.  The external effects are, 
of course, critical for long-run growth given the diminishing returns to private knowledge 
capital.  Romer was agnostic as to whether the knowledge capital should be thought of as 
disembodied (knowledge in books) or embodied (physical capital and/or human capital). 
  Lucas (1988) was more specific, stressing the importance of human capital.  Lucas 
sketched two models, one with human capital accumulated off-the-job and another with 
human capital accumulated on-the-job (i.e., learning by doing).  Both models featured 
externalities.  In the model with human capital accumulated off-the-job, Lucas posited  
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Here u is the fraction of time spent working, and 1−u is the fraction of time spent 
accumulating human capital; h is an individual worker’s human capital, and H is economy-3 
wide average human capital; k and n are physical capital and number of workers at a given 
firm.  Because human capital accumulation is linear in the level of human capital, human 
capital is an engine of growth in this model.  This is true with or without the externalities; 
across-dynasty externalities are not necessary for growth.  As Lucas discusses, however, 
within-dynasty human capital spillovers are implicit if one imagines (2.3) as successive 
generations of finite-lived individuals within a dynasty.  Within-dynasty externalities, 
however, would not have the same normative implications as across-dynasty externalities, 
namely underinvestment in human capital.  Lucas (1988) did not argue that across-dynasty 
externalities were needed to fit particular facts.  But he later observed that such across-
household externalities could help explain why we see “immigration at maximal allowable 
rates and beyond from poor countries to wealthy ones” (Lucas 1990, p. 93). 
  Tamura (1991) analyzed a human capital externality in the production of human 
capital itself.  This formulation conformed better to the intuition that individuals learn from 
the knowledge of others.  Tamura specified 
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Because H represents economy-wide average human capital, β < 1 implies that learning 
externalities are essential for sustaining growth in Tamura’s setup.  If applied to each 
country, this model would suggest that immigrants from poor to rich countries should enjoy 
fast wage growth after they migrate, as they learn from being around higher average human 
capital in richer countries.  Lucas (2004) used such learning externalities within cities as an 
ingredient of a model of urbanization and development. 
Models not always thought of as having knowledge externalities are Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil’s (1992) augmented Solow model and the original Solow (1956) 
neoclassical growth model.  In Solow’s model all firms within the economy enjoy the same 
level of TFP.  This common level of TFP reflects technology accessible to all.  The Solow 
model therefore does feature disembodied knowledge externalities across firms within an 
economy.  In Mankiw et al.’s extension, knowledge externalities flow across countries as 4 
well as across firms within countries.  In section 4 we will discuss models with more 
limited international diffusion of knowledge.  In these models imperfect diffusion means 
differences in TFP can play a role in explaining differences in income levels and growth 
rates.  We stress that the Mankiw et al. model relies on even stronger externalities than the 
typical model of international technology spillovers, such as Parente and Prescott (1994) or 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 8).  We will discuss these models at greater length 
in Section 4, when we calibrate a hybrid version of them. 
 
2B. Models with Knowledge Externalities and New-Good Externalities 
Models with both knowledge externalities and new-good externalities are the most 
plentiful in the endogenous growth literature.  By “new-good externalities” we mean 
surplus to consumers and/or firms from the introduction of new goods.  The new goods take 
the form of new varieties and/or higher quality versions of existing varieties.  In Stokey 
(1988), learning by doing leads to the introduction of new goods over time.  The new goods 
are of higher quality, and eventually displace older goods.  The learning is completely 
external to firms, and what is learned applies to new goods even more than older goods.  
Hence learning externalities are at the heart of her growth process.  In Stokey (1991), 
intergenerational human capital externalities (the young learn from the old) are critical for 
human capital accumulation.  Human capital accumulation, in turn, facilitates the 
introduction of higher quality goods, which are intensive in human capital in her model. 
Quality ladder models − pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 4) and 
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) − feature knowledge spillovers in that each quality 
innovation is built on the previous leading-edge technology.  Such intertemporal knowledge 
spillovers are also fundamental in models with expanding product variety, such as Romer 
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Intermediate goods, the x(i)’s, are imperfect substitutes in production.  This is the Dixit-
Stiglitz “love of variety” model.  The stock of varieties, or ideas, is A.  In (2.7) new ideas 
are invented using human capital and, critically, the previous stock of ideas.  This is the 
intertemporal knowledge spillover.  Jones (1995, 2002) argues that, in contrast to (2.7), 
there are likely to be diminishing returns to the stock of ideas (an exponent less than 1 on 
A).  He bases this on the fact that the number of research scientists and engineers have 
grown in the U.S. and other rich countries since 1950, yet the growth rate has not risen, as 
(2.7) would predict.  Intertemporal knowledge spillovers still play a pivotal role in Jones’ 
specification; they are just not as strong as in Romer’s (2.7). 
More recent models, such as Eaton and Kortum (1996) and Howitt (1999, 2000), 
continue to emphasize both knowledge externalities and new-good externalities.  We will 
elaborate on these in Section 4 below. 
 
2C. Models with New-Good Externalities 
It is hard to find a model with new-good externalities but without knowledge 
externalities.  We have identified three papers in the literature featuring such models, but 
two of the papers also have versions of their models with knowledge externalities. 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) present a variation on Romer’s (1990) model, as 
part of their analysis of the potential growth gains from international integration.  In their 
twist, new intermediate goods are invented using factors in the same proportions as for final 
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They call this the “lab equipment model” to underscore the use of equipment in the research 
lab, just like in the production of final goods.  In this formulation, they emphasize, “Access 
to the designs for all previous goods, and familiarity with the ideas and know-how that they 
represent, does not aid the creation of new designs” (p. 536-537).  I.e., there are no 
knowledge externalities, domestic or international.  Production of ideas is not even 
knowledge-intensive.  Ideas are embodied in goods, however, and there is surplus to 
downstream consumers from their availability.  Rivera-Batiz and Romer note that this 6 
model allows countries to benefit from ideas developed elsewhere simply by importing the 
resulting products.  Just as important, international trade allows international specialization 
in research.  Countries can specialize in inventing different products, rather than every 
product being invented everywhere. 
In a similar spirit, Romer (1994) considered a model in which knowledge about how 
to produce different varieties does not flow across countries, but each country can import 
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xj represents the quantity of imports of the j
th variety of intermediate good.  Because α < 1, 
intermediate varieties are imperfectly substitutable in production.  Firms in the importing 
country will have higher labor productivity the more import varieties they can access.  If 
exporters cannot perfectly price discriminate and there is perfect competition among 
domestic final-goods producers, the higher labor productivity (higher Y/N) will benefit 
domestic workers/consumers.  If consumer varieties were imported as well, there would be 
an additional source of consumer surplus from import varieties.  Romer analyzed the impact 
of import tariffs on the number of varieties M imported in the presence of fixed costs of 
importing each variety in each country.  Although Romer’s model is static, growth in the 
number of varieties over time, say due to domestic population growth or falling barriers to 
trade, would be a source of growth in productivity and welfare in his model. 
Kortum (1997) develops a model in which researchers draw techniques of varying 
efficiency levels from a Poisson distribution.  Kortum does consider spillovers in the form 
of targeted search.  But he also considers the case of blind search, wherein draws are 
independent of the previous draws.  (Kortum fixes the set of goods produced but allows 
endogenous research into discovering better techniques for producing each good.)  In the 
case of blind search, there are no knowledge spillovers.  Growth is sustained solely because 
of population growth that raises the supply of and demand for researchers.  It takes more 
and more draws to obtain a quality deep enough into the right tail to constitute an 7 
improvement.  A constant population growth rate sustains a constant flow of quality 
improvements and, hence, a constant growth rate of income. 
 
2D. Models with No Externalities 
The seminal growth models without externalities are the AK models of Jones and 
Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991).  In the next section we will present evidence at odds 
with such models, so we dwell on their implications here.  We consider a version close to 
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where Y K  and Y H  represent the stocks of physical capital and human capital devoted to 
producing current output.  As shown, current output can be used for either consumption or 
investment.  The accumulation equations for physical and human capital are, respectively, 
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H H  and H K  represent the stocks of human and physical capital, respectively, devoted to 
accumulating human capital. 
We will focus on an equilibrium with a constant fraction of output invested in 
physical capital ( / I sI Y = ) and a constant share of human capital deployed in human 
capital accumulation ( / HH sH H = ).  We assume that the ratio of marginal products of 
physical and human capital are equated across the final output and human capital sectors, so 
that physical capital is devoted to  
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The balanced growth rate is defined as 
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The level of the balanced growth rate is an implicit function of the investment rates and 
parameter values: 
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Provided  1 α < , human capital is the engine of growth.  The growth rate is monotonically 
increasing in  I s  because physical capital is an input into human capital accumulation 
whereas consumption is not.  Related, the growth rate does not monotonically increase with 
the share of inputs devoted to producing human capital.  This is because devoting more 
resources to producing current output increases the stock of physical capital, which is an 
input into human capital accumulation and hence growth.
1  When we look at the data in 
Section 3, however, we will find no country so high an  H s  or  K s  as to inhibit its growth 
according to this model. 
When  1 α =  we have a literal YA K =  model, and the growth rate is solely a 
function of the physical capital investment rate: 
 
(2.16)  KI gA s δ + =  
 
Here there is no point in devoting effort to producing human capital, so  0 H s = . 
In the special case  1 γ = , human capital is produced solely with human capital.  This 
might be called a BH model.  Presuming  1 α <  of course, the growth rate is simply 
 
                                                           
1 To reinforce intuition, consider the (unrealistic) case of  0 γ = , wherein new human capital is produced only 
with physical capital.  In this case, growth is not strictly increasing in  K s  (the share of capital devoted to 
human capital production) because some physical capital itself needs to be devoted to its own production. 9 
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Unlike when  1 γ < , the growth rate here is monotonically increasing in the effort 
devoted to adding more human capital.  Lucas (1988) and many successors focus on this 
BH model because human capital accumulation is evidently intensive in human capital.  
Moreover, even AK models such as Jones and Manuelli (1990) construe their K to 
incorporate both human capital and physical capital.  The consensus for diminishing returns 
to physical capital ( 1 α < ) is strong.  Constant returns are entertained only for a broad 
measure of physical and human capital.  We stress (2.15), a hybrid of AK and BH models, 
because this generalization allows us to take into account the combined impact of physical 
and human capital investment rates on growth when physical capital is an input to human 
capital accumulation ( 1 γ < ). 
 
3.  Cross-Country Evidence 
In this section we document a number of facts about country growth experiences 
over the last fifty years.  We show that country growth rates appear to depend critically on 
the growth and income levels of other countries, rather than solely on domestic investment 
rates in physical and human capital.  Cross-country externalities are a promising 
explanation for this interdependence.  In brief, here are the main facts we will present: 
 
•   The growth slowdown that began in the mid-1970s was a world-wide phenomenon.  It 
hit both rich countries and poor countries, and economies on every continent. 
 
•   Richer OECD countries grew much more slowly from 1950 to around 1980, despite the 
fact that richer OECD economies invested at higher rates in physical and human capital. 
 
•   Differences in country investment rates are far more persistent than differences in 
country growth rates. 
 10 
•   Countries with high investment rates tend to have high levels of income more than they 
tend to have high growth rates.  
 
3A. The World-Wide Growth Slowdown 
 
As has been widely documented for rich countries, the growth rate of productivity 
slowed beginning in the early 1970s.
2  Less widely known is that the slowdown has been a 
world-wide phenomenon, rather than just an OECD-specific event.
3  We document this in 
Table 2.  Across 96 countries, the growth rate in PPP GDP per worker fell from 2.7% per 
year over 1960-1975 to 1.1% per year over 1975-2000.  Growth decelerated 1.6 percentage 
points on average in both the sample of 23 OECD countries and the in the sample of 73 
non-OECD countries.
4  The slowdown hit North and South America the hardest (their 
growth rates fell 2.4 percentage points) and barely brushed Asia (who slowed down just 0.4 
of a percentage point).  The slowdown hit all income quartiles of the 96 country sample 
(based on PPP income per worker in 1975).  Although each income quartile grew at least 
one percentage point slower, the slowdown was not as severe in the poorest half as in the 
richest half.  China’s growth rate actually accelerated from 1.8 to 5.1, in the wake of 
reforms that began in the late 1970s.  Chile, which experienced rapid growth in the 1990s, 
accelerated 2.1 percentage points. 
Why does a world-wide growth slowdown suggest international externalities?  
Couldn’t it simply reflect declining investment rates world-wide, as suggested by the AK 
model in the previous section?  Table 2 also shows what average investment rates in 
physical and human capital did before and after the mid-1970s.  The investment rates in 
physical capital come from Penn World Table 6.1.  As a proxy for the fraction of time 
devoted to accumulating more human capital, we used years of schooling attainment 
relative to a 60-year working life.  We used data on schooling attainment for the 25 and 
older population from Barro and Lee (2000).  This human capital investment rate, which 
averages around 7% across countries, reflects the fraction of ages 5 to 65 devoted to 
schooling as opposed to working.  We prefer the attainment of the workforce as opposed to 
                                                           
2 The causes of the slowdown remain largely a mystery.  For example, see Fischer (1988). 
3 An exception is Easterly (2001b). 
4 OECD countries are based on 1975 membership.  There were 24 OECD members in 1975, 
but the Penn World Tables contain data for unified Germany only back to 1970. 11 
the enrollment rates of the school-age population.  The latter should take a long time to 
affect the workforce and therefore the growth rate. 
According to Table 2, the average investment rate in physical capital across all 
countries was virtually unchanged (15.8% before vs. 15.5% after the slowdown), and the 
investment rate in human capital actually rose strongly (going from 7.1% to 9.7%).  The 
same pattern applies for the OECD and non-OECD separately, and for all four quartiles of 
initial income.  Thus the growth slowdown cannot be attributed to a world-wide decline in 
investment rates. 
The breadth of the growth slowdown suggests something linking country growth 
rates, and ostensibly something other than investment rates.
5  This is contrary to the 
predictions of AK models, in which the growth rate of a country depends on domestic 
investment rates.  The world-wide nature of the slowdown suggests that endogenous growth 
models, more generally, should not be applied to individual countries but rather to a 
collection of interdependent countries.  Knowledge diffusion through trade, migration, and 
foreign direct investment are likely sources of interdependence. 
Three other examples of interdependence are offered by Parente and Prescott 
(2004).  First, growth rates picked up in the 20
th century relative to the 19
th century for 
many countries.  Second, the time it takes a country to go from $2000 to $4000 in per capita 
income has fallen over the 20
th century, suggesting the potential to grow rapidly by 
adopting technology in use elsewhere.  Third and related, they stress that “growth miracles” 
always occur in countries with incomes well beneath the richest countries, again consistent 
with adoption of technology from abroad. 
Knowledge diffusion, broadly construed, could include imitation of successful 
institutions and policies in other countries.  Kremer, Onatski and Stock (2001) argue that 
such imitation might explain the empirical transition matrix of the world income 
distribution.  If improving institutions leads only to static gains in efficiency, however, then 
the barriers to imitation have to be large to explain why the best institutions are not in place 
everywhere.  As we will illustrate in section 4 below, the required barriers to technology 
adoption are modest precisely because the benefits accumulate with investments. 
                                                           
5 It also casts doubt on explanations for the growth slowdown that are confined to rich countries. 12 
3B. Beta Convergence in the OECD 
 
As documented by Baumol (1986) and many others, incomes have generally been 
converging in the OECD.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) used the term sigma convergence 
to describe such episodes of declining cross-sectional standard deviations in log incomes.  
We focus on a related concept that Barro and Sala-i-Martin labeled beta convergence, 
namely a negative correlation between a country’s initial income level and its subsequent 
growth rate.  We look at beta convergence year by year in Figure 1.  The data on PPP 
income per worker comes from Penn World Table 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002), 
and covers 23 OECD countries over 1960-2000.  The Figure shows the correlation between 
current income and growth hovering between –0.50 and –0.75 from 1960 through the early 
1980s.  The correlation was still negative from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, but 
less so, and turned positive in the latter 1990s. 
De Long (1988) pointed out that a country’s OECD membership is endogenous to 
its level of income, so that members at time t will tend to converge toward each other’s 
incomes leading up to time t.  Our focus, however, is not on convergence per se.  Our point 
is instead about how investment rates correlate with income during the period of 
convergence.  Figure 1 also shows the physical capital investment rate, and it is positively 
correlated with a country’s income throughout the sample.  Figure 2 shows that schooling 
attainment is also positively correlated with income throughout the sample. 
How do these investment correlations square with simple AK models with no 
externalities?  Expression (2.15) shows that a country’s growth rate should be increasing in 
its investment rates.  For beta convergence to occur in this model, a country’s investment 
rates must be negatively correlated with a country’s level of income.  But Figures 1 and 2 
show the opposite is true: in every year, richer OECD countries had higher investment rates 
in human and physical capital than poorer OECD countries did.  According to this class of 
models, OECD countries should have been diverging throughout the entire sample, rather 
than converging through most of it.  Now, this reasoning ignores likely differences in 
efficiency parameters A and B across countries.  But rescuing AK models would require that 
richer countries have lower efficiency parameters.  We would guess that rich countries tend 
to have better rather than worse institutions (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999).  
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3C. Low Persistence of Growth Rate Differences 
 
Easterly et al. (1993) documented that country growth rate differences do not persist 
much from decade to decade.  They estimated correlations of around 0.1 to 0.3 across 
decades.  In contrast, they found that country characteristics such as education levels and 
investment rates exhibit cross-decade correlations in the 0.6 to 0.9 range.  Just as we do, 
they suggest country characteristics may determine relative income levels and world-wide 
technological changes long-run growth.  Easterly and Levine (2001) similarly provide 
evidence that “growth is not persistent, but factor accumulation is.” 
In Table 3 we present similar findings.  We compare average growth rates from 
1980-2000 vs. 1960-1980, and from decade to decade within 1960-2000.  We find growth 
rates much less persistent than investment rates for the world as a whole, and for the OECD 
and non-OECD separately.  Again, these facts seem hard to reconcile with the AK model in 
which a country’s domestic investment rates determine its growth rate. 
Figure 3 illustrates a related pattern:  deciles of countries (based on 1960 income per 
worker) grew at similar average rates from 1960 to 2000.  Each decile consists of the 
unweighted average of income per worker in 9 or 10 countries.  The average growth rate is 
1.7% in the sample, and the bottom decile in 1960 grew at precisely this rate.  This figure 
suggests movements in relative incomes, but no permanent differences in long-run growth 
rates, even comparing the richest and poorest countries.  This sample contains 96 countries, 
and therefore many of the poorest countries mired in zero or negative growth. 
Pritchett (1997), on the other hand, offers compelling evidence that incomes 
diverged massively from 1800 to 1960.  Doesn’t this divergence favor models, such as AK 
without international externalities, in which country growth rates are not intertwined?  Not 
necessarily.  As argued by Parente and Prescott (2004), the opening up of large income 
differences coincided with the onset of modern economic growth.  The divergence could 
reflect the interaction of country-specific barriers to technology adoption with the 
emergence of modern technology-driven growth.  More generally, any given divergence 
episode could reflect widening barriers to importing technology rather than simply 
differences in conventional investment rates. 
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3D. Investment Rates and Growth vs. Levels 
The AK model we sketched in the previous section predicts that a country’s growth 
rate will be strongly related to its investment rates in physical and human capital.  In Table 
4 we investigate this empirically in cross-sections of countries over 1960-2000.  In four of 
the six cases, the average investment rate is positively and significantly related to the 
average growth rate.  For the OECD, the physical capital investment rate is not significantly 
related to country growth, and the human capital investment rate is actually negatively and 
significantly related to country growth.  But for the non-OECD and all-country samples, the 
signs and significance are as predicted.  This evidence constitutes the empirical bulwark for 
AK models. 
In the four cases where the signs are as predicted, are the magnitudes roughly as an 
AK model would predict?  First consider the literal AK model.  According to (2.16) in the 
previous section, the coefficient on  I s  should be A.  What might be a reasonable value for 
A?  In order to match the average growth rate in GDP per worker (1.8%), given an average 
investment rate in physical capital (17%) and a customary depreciation rate (8%), the value 
of A would need to be 
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This level of A is more than four times larger than the two significant positive coefficients 
on  I s  in the first column of Table 4, which are around 0.12.  The estimated coefficients are 
small in magnitude compared to what an AK model would predict.  This discrepancy could 
reflect classical measurement error in investment rates, but such measurement error would 
need to account for more than 80% of the variance of investment rates across countries.  
Plus one would expect positive endogeneity bias in estimating the average level of A, due to 
variation in A across countries that is positively correlated with variation in  I s . 
We next consider the literal BH model.  According to (2.17), the coefficient on  H s  
should be B.  To produce the average growth rate in GDP per worker given the average 15 
investment rate in human capital (8.8%) and a modest depreciation rate (2%), B would need 
to be 
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The third column of estimates in Table 4 contain coefficients on  H s .  Of the two positive 
coefficients, one is half the predicted level (0.21) whereas the other is not far from the 
predicted level (0.37). 
Finally, consider the hybrid model in (2.15).  We assume  0.9 γ =  so that human 
capital accumulation is intensive in human capital, but does use some physical capital.  For 
producing current output we assume the standard physical capital share of   1/3 α = .  We 
set the depreciation rates as previously mentioned.  We set  K s , the share of physical capital 
devoted to human capital accumulation, based on (2.13).  As (2.15) illustrates, we cannot 
independently identify A and B, only their product.  We set 
11 0.60, AB
γα −− ≅  so that the 
average predicted growth rate from (2.15) and observed  H s  and  I s  investment rates 
matches the average growth rate in GDP per worker of 1.8%.  We then regress actual 
growth rates on predicted growth rates for a cross-section of 73 countries with available 
data.  The coefficient estimated is 0.26 (standard error 0.08, R
2 of 0.13), far below the 
theoretical value of 1.  Again, the empirical estimate might be low because of measurement 
error in predicted growth, but it would need to be large. 
To recap, only 1 of the 7 coefficients of growth on investment rates considered is in 
the ballpark of an AK model’s prediction.  In contrast, we obtain uniformly positive and 
significant coefficients when we regress (log) levels of country income on country 
investment rates.   In 5 of the 6 cases, the R
2 is notably higher with levels than with growth 
rates.  Investment rates appear far better at explaining relative income levels than relative 
growth rates.  The driver of growth rates would appear to be something other than simply 
domestic investment rates. 
The preceding discussion focused on the steady-state predictions of AK models.  It 
is possible that AK models fare better empirically when transition dynamics are taken into 16 
account.  But it is worth noting that Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997),  Hall and Jones 
(1999), Bils and Klenow (2000), Easterly (2001a), Easterly and Levine (2001), and 
Hendricks (2002) all find that no more than half of the variation in growth rates or income 
levels can be attributed directly to human and physical capital.  Pritchett (2004), who 
considers many different parameterizations of the human capital accumulation technology, 
likewise finds that human capital does not account for much cross-country variation in 
growth rates. 
 
3E. R&D and TFP 
We now turn away from AK models to a model with diminishing returns to physical 
and human capital, but with R&D as another form of investment.  Such a model might be 
able to explain country growth rates with no reference to cross-country externalities.  For 
example, perhaps a variant of the Romer (1990) model could be applied country by country, 
with no international knowledge flows.  R&D investment would have to behave in a way 
that leads to a worldwide growth slowdown, beta convergence in the OECD, and low 
persistence of growth rate differences.  And, more directly, R&D investment would have to 
explain country growth rates.  Research effort, like human capital, is difficult to measure.  
But Lederman and Saenz (2003) have compiled data on R&D spending for many countries.  
We now ask the same questions of their R&D investment rates that we asked of investment 
rates in physical and human capital: how correlated are R&D investment rates with country 
growth rates and country income levels? 
The first column in Table 5 says that countries with high R&D spending relative to 
GDP do not grow systematically faster.
6  Countries with high R&D shares do, however, 
tend to have high relative incomes.  But the correlation with income is not significant 
outside the OECD.  One possibility is that these regressions do not adequately control for 
the contributions of physical and capital.  We therefore move to construct Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth rates and levels.  We subtract estimates of human and physical 
capital per worker from GDP per worker: 
 
 
                                                           
6 Because R&D data was not available for all country-years between 1960 and 2000, we took time effects out 
of the variables (growth rates, income levels, investment rates in R&D), then averaged the residuals over time. 17 
(3.3)  ln ln( / ) ln( / ) (1 )ln( / ) TFP Y L K L H L α α =− − −  
 
where Y  is real GDP, L is employment, K  is the real stock of physical capital, and H  is 
the real stock of human capital.  We suppress time and country subscripts in (3.3) for 
readability.  We would prefer to let α  vary across countries and across time based on factor 
shares, but such data is not readily available for most countries in the sample.  We instead 
set 1/3 α =  for all countries and time periods.  Gollin (2002) finds that capital’s share 
varies from 0.20 to 0.35 across a sample of countries, but does not correlate with country 
income levels or growth rates.  We use Penn World Table 6.1 data assembled by Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2002) for PPP GDP, employment, and PPP investment in physical 
capital.  We assume an 8% geometric depreciation rate and the usual accumulation equation 
to cumulate investment into physical capital stocks.  We approximate initial capital stocks 
using the procedure in Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997, p. 78).  We let human capital 
per worker be a simple Mincerian function of schooling: 
 
(3.4)  exp( ) H hL s L φ = = . 
 
 
Here h represents human capital per worker, and s denotes years of schooling attainment.  
We use Barro and Lee (2000) data on the schooling attainment of the 25 and older 
population.  This data is available every five years from 1960 to 2000, with the last year an 
extrapolation based on enrollment rates and the slow-moving stock of workers.  A more 
complete Mincerian formulation would include years of experience in addition to schooling 
and would sum the human capital stocks of workers with different education and 
experience levels.  In Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) we found that taking experience 
and heterogeneity into account had little effect on aggregate levels and growth rates, so we 
do not pursue it here.  We use (3.4) with the Mincerian return  0.085 φ = , based on the 
returns estimated for many countries and described by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002). 
  The latter columns in Table 5 present regressions of TFP growth rates and levels on 
R&D investment rates.  The sample of countries is smaller given data limitations (67 
countries rather than 82).  Just like growth in GDP per worker, growth in TFP is not 
significantly related to R&D investment rates.  But TFP levels, like levels of GDP per 18 
worker, are positively and significantly related to R&D investment rates.  From this we 
conclude that even R&D investment rates affect relative income levels, not long-run growth 
rates.  The persistence of R&D investment rate differences across countries, combined with 
the lack of persistent growth rate differences, supports this interpretation.  We are led to 
consider models in which country growth rates are tethered together. 
Before considering a model with international knowledge externalities, we pause to 
consider a model with “externalities” operating through the terms of trade.  We have in 
mind Acemoglu and Ventura’s (2002) model of the world income distribution.  In their 
model, each country operates an AK technology, but uses it to produce distinct national 
varieties.  Countries with high AK levels due to high investment rates plentifully supply 
their varieties, driving down their prices on the world market.  This results in a pAK model 
with a stationary distribution of income even in the face of permanent differences in 
country investment rates (and A levels, for that matter).  Prices tether incomes together in 
the world distribution, not the flow of ideas.  This is a clever and coherent model, but we 
question its empirical relevance.  Hummels and Klenow (2004) find that richer countries 
tend to export a given product at higher rather than lower prices.  They do estimate 
modestly lower quality-adjusted prices for richer countries, but nowhere near the extent 
needed to offset AK forces and generate “only” a factor of 30 difference in incomes.   
To summarize this section, AK models tightly connect investment rates and growth 
rates.  Such a tight connection does not hold empirically.  This is the case for the world 
growth slowdown, for OECD convergence, for growth persistence, and for country 
variation in growth vs. income levels.  A version of the AK model with endogenous terms 
of trade might be able to circumvent these empirical hazards but faces empirical troubles of 




4. Models with common growth driven by international knowledge spillovers  
 
Based on evidence in the previous section, we now focus on models with two 
features.  The first is that, in steady state, all countries grow at the same rate thanks to 
international knowledge spillovers.  The second feature is that differences in policies or 19 
other country parameters generate differences in TFP levels rather than growth rates.  
Examples of this type of model are Howitt (2000), Parente and Prescott (1994), Eaton and 
Kortum (1996), as well as the model of technology diffusion in chapter 8 of Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995).   
In these models there is a world technology frontier, and a country’s research efforts 
determine how close the country gets to that frontier.  There are three different issues that 
must be addressed.  First, what determines the growth rate of the world technology frontier?  
Second, how is it that a country’s research efforts allow it to “tap into” the world 
technology frontier?  And third, what explains differences across countries in their research 
efforts?  Our goal in this section is to build on the ideas developed in the recent literature to 
construct a model that offers a unified treatment of these three issues and that is amenable 
to calibration.  The calibration is intended to gauge the model’s implications about the 
strength of the different externalities and the drivers of cross-country productivity 
differences.
7 
To highlight the different issues relevant for the model, our strategy is to present it 
in parts.  The next subsection (4A) takes world growth and R&D investment as exogenous 
and discusses how R&D investment determines steady state relative productivity.  
Subsection 4B discusses different ways of modeling how world-wide R&D investment 
determines the growth rate of the world technology frontier.  Subsection 4C extends the 
model so as to allow for endogenous determination of countries’ R&D investment rates.  
Subsection 4D calibrates the model.  Finally, subsection 4E presents the results of an 
exercise where we calculate, for each country in our sample, the impact on productivity 
from international spillovers.   
 
4A. R&D investment and relative productivity 
 
In this section we focus on a single country whose research efforts determine its 
productivity relative to the world technology frontier.  Both the R&D investment rate and 
the rate of growth of the world technology frontier are exogenous.  Output is produced with 
                                                           
7 Although we refer to research externalities throughout this section, the knowledge externalities could just as 
well be with respect to human capital.  Only when we use data on R&D is the analysis specific to research. 20 
a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
1 () , YKA h L
α α − =  where Y is total output, K is the 
physical capital stock, A is a technology index, h is human capital per person, and L is the 
total labor force.  We assume that h is constant and exogenous.  Output can be used for 
consumption (C), investment (I), or research (R), YCp IR = ++ , where p  is the relative 
price of investment and is assumed constant through time.  Capital is accumulated 
according to: KI K δ =−  .  Finally, A evolves according to: 
 
(4.1)  () ( ) /1 / * A RL A AA λε =+ −   
 
whereλ  is a positive parameter and A* is the world technology frontier, both common 
across countries.
8 
There are three salient differences between this model and the standard endogenous 
growth model.  Firstly, the productivity of research in generating A-growth is affected by 
the country’s productivity relative to the frontier, as determined by the term (1 / *) A A − in 
(4.1).  This captures the idea that there are “benefits to backwardness”.  One reason for this 
may be that the effective cost of innovation and technology adoption falls when a country is 
further away from the world technology frontier.  This is what happens in Parente and 
Prescott (1994) and in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 8).  Alternatively, being 
further behind the frontier may confer an advantage because every successful technology 
adoption entails a greater improvement in the national technology level.  This is what 
happens in Howitt (2000) and in Eaton and Kortum (1996).
9 
Secondly, we introduce  0 ε ≥  to capture the sources of technology diffusion from 
abroad that do not depend on domestic research efforts.  We have in mind imports of goods 
that embody technology, and that do not require upfront adoption costs (e.g, equipment 
                                                           
8 In models like those of Parente and Prescott (1994) and Howitt (2000) research is meant to capture both 
R&D and technology adoption efforts.  In this paper we follow this practice and simply refer to the sum of 
these two technology investments as R&D or just “research”. 
9 In Howitt’s model, (1 / *) A A −  arises from the product of two terms: (1/ *)( * ) A AA − . The (1/ *) A  term 
arises because, as the world’s technology becomes more advanced, more research is required to tap into it; the 
second term captures the fact that, when the country is more backward, every successful technology adoption 
entails a greater improvement in the national technology level.   21 
which is no harder to use but which operates more efficiently).
10  As we will see below, this 
is important for the model to match certain features of the data. 
Thirdly, in contrast to most endogenous growth models, we divide research effort by 
L in the A-growth expression above.  This is done to get rid of scale effects and can be 
motivated in two ways.  First, if A represents the quality of inputs, then one can envisage a 
process where an increase in the labor force leads to an expansion in the variety of inputs 
(Young, 1998 and Howitt, 1999).  With a larger variety of inputs, research effort per variety 
is diluted.  This eliminates the impact of L on A growth.  Second, if research is undertaken 
by firms to increase their own productivity, then population growth may lead to an 
expansion in the number of firms and a decrease in the impact of aggregate research on 
firms’ A-growth (Parente and Prescott, 1994).  In this case, L represents the number of 
firms. 
The measured R&D investment rate is given by  / R sR Y = .  This implies that 
/( ) /( ) RR R AL s Y AL s k ==  where 
/(1 ) (/) / ( ) kK Y h Y A L
αα − ≡= .  To proceed, note that in 
steady state  /* aA A ≡  will be constant, since A will grow at the same rate as A*, which we 
denote by  A g .  Thus, from (4.1) 
 
(4.2)  ( )( ) 1 AR gs k a λε = +−  
 
 












The values of k  and  R s  determine a country’s relative A  from (4.3).  Conceivably, the 
parameterλ  (TFP in research, if you will) could differ across countries and also contribute 
to differences in A.  But in this paper we assumeλ  does not vary across countries.  We do, 
                                                           
10 This free flow of ideas is also likely to depend on the local presence of multinationals, which bring valuable 
knowledge that diffuses to other local firms without the need for additional R&D. 22 
however, allow researchers to be more productive in countries with more physical and 
human capital per worker. 
The previous results clearly show that policies that lower investment in physical or 
human capital or R&D do not affect a country’s growth rate.  Their effect is on a country’s 
steady state relative A.  Also, as discussed above, there are no scale effects in this model: 
higher L does not lead to higher growth or to a higher relative A.  This stands in contrast to 
most growth models based on research (e.g., Romer 1990, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 – 
chapter 8). 
It is also noteworthy in equation (4.3) that the value of k , which captures physical 
and human capital intensity, affects a country’s TFP level conditional on its R&D 
investment rate.  Thus, large differences in TFP across countries do not necessarily imply 
that differences in human and physical capital stocks are just a small part of cross country 
income differences.  Indeed, this model suggests that some of the TFP differences may be 
due to differences in capital intensities across countries.  Below we explore this issue 
quantitatively. 
It is instructive to calculate the social rate of return to research at the national level.  
As shown in Jones and Williams (1998), this can be done even without knowing the details 
of the model that affect the endogenous determination of the R&D investment rate.  Letting 
(,) AG A R =  , Jones and Williams show that the (within-country) social rate of return r  can 
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Here A P  stands for the price of ideas and is given by ()
1
/ A PG R
−
=∂ ∂ .  As explained by 
Jones and Williams, the first two terms in (4.4) represent the dividends of research while 
the third term represents the associated capital gains.  The first dividend term is the obvious 
component, namely the productivity gain from an additional idea divided by the price of 
ideas.  The second dividend term captures how an additional idea affects the productivity of 
future R&D. 23 
In the model we presented above, it is straightforward to show that, along a steady 
state path, we have: 
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The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the first dividend term in Jones and 
Williams’ formula.  The second term, in square brackets, corresponds to the indirect effect 
of increasing A on the cost of research ( / GA ∂ ∂ ).  The third term, L g , corresponds to the 
term capturing the capital gains in Jones and Williams formula.  To understand this last 
term, note that we have implicitly assumed that new varieties or firms start up with the 
same productivity as existing varieties or firms.  Thus, the value of ideas will rise faster 
with a higher L g , and the social return to research will correspondingly increase with L g . 
Also note that, since the RHS of (4.5) is decreasing in a and a is increasing in  R s , 
the social rate of return to research will be decreasing in  R s , as one would expect.  If k 
varies less than a in the data, one should also expect to find higher social rates of return to 
research in poor countries than in rich countries, as found by Lederman and Maloney 
(2003). 
More importantly, if ε  is close to zero, then from (4.2) and (4.5) we should have 
R A s g a k r / ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ~ α λ α − ≈ − − ≈ .  Using the growth rate of A in the OECD in the period 
1960-2000 as an approximation of A g  (1.5%), and using α = 1/3, then  0.01/ R rs ≈  .  Noting 
that the median of  R s  in the non-OECD countries we have in our sample is  0.5% R s = , then 
200% r ≥  .  This seems implausibly high.
11  There are two ways out of this problem.  First, 
one can argue that measured R&D investment does not capture all the research efforts 
undertaken by countries.  Clearly, higher R&D investment rates would lead to lower and 
more plausible social rates of return to research.  Second, one can argue that the implausible 
implications of the model are due to the assumption that ε  is close to zero.  In the 
                                                           
11 The problem is not so pronounced for the U.S.  Given its measured R&D investment rate of  2.5%
R s = , we 
have  40% r ≈  , which is in the range of estimates of the social rate of return to R&D in the U.S.  See Griliches 
(1992) and Hall (1996). 24 
calibration exercise in section 4D, we will argue that both of these solutions are needed to 
make the model consistent with the data.   
  
4B. Modeling growth in the world technology frontier 
In this section we extend the model so that  A g  is endogenously determined by the 
research efforts in all countries.  The models we mentioned above deal with this in different 
ways, except Parente and Prescott who leave  A g  as exogenous.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995, chapter 8) have a Romer-type model of innovation that determines  A g  in the 
“North.”  We do not pursue this possibility because of the scale effect that arises in their 
model (larger L in the North leads to higher  A g ) and because we want to allow research 
efforts by all countries to contribute to the world growth rate.  We first consider an 
adaptation of Howitt’s (2000) formulation.  A country’s total effective research effort,  i R λ , 
gets diluted by the country’s number of varieties or number of firms, both represented by 
i L , and is then multiplied by a common spillover parameter, σ , to determine that country’s 












⎝⎠ ∑  . 
 
Given our results above, we obtain: 
 
(H1)  A iR ii
i
gk s a σλ = ∑ . 
 
 
This formulation has the nice feature that the world growth rate does not depend on the 
world’s level of L (no scale effect on growth at the world level), although it does depend 
positively on R&D investment rates.  The main problem with this formulation, and the 
reason we do not pursue it further, is that larger countries contribute no more to world 
growth than smaller countries do.  This has the implausible implication that subdividing 
countries would raise the world growth rate. 25 
In footnote 21 of his paper, Howitt discusses an alternative specification wherein 









σ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑  . 
 
 
where  i L L =∑ .  Howitt does not pursue this approach because, in the presence of steady-
state differences in the rate of growth of L across countries,  A g  would be completely 
determined in the limit by the research effort of the country with the largest rate of growth 
of L.  We believe, however, that it is quite natural to analyze the case in which  L g  is the 
same across countries.
12  In this case,  / ii LL ω ≡  is constant through time, and the 
expression above can be manipulated to yield: 
 
(H2)  A iR ii i
i
gk s a σ λω = ∑ . 
 
 
If we think of L as the number of firms rather than the number of varieties of 
capital goods, then (H2) amounts to stating that  A g  is determined by the country-
workforce-weighted average research intensity across firms world-wide.  This seems much 
more reasonable than (H1), where  A g  is determined by the unweighted average of research 
intensity across countries. 
Expression (H2) differs from (H1) only in the presence of the weights  i ω  that 
represent shares of world L.  This has two advantages: first, large countries contribute 
more to world growth than small countries do, and second, subdividing countries would not 
affect the world growth rate.  But (H2) has a problematic implication, namely that those 
countries with higher than average  iR ii ks a would be better off disengaging from the rest of 
                                                           
12 If one country’s population did come to dominate world population, however, it might be sensible to say it 
does almost all of the world’s research and, hence, it will virtually determine the world growth rate.  We 
assume equal labor force growth rates across countries not because we think it is accurate for describing what 
is happening now, but because we think it is a convenient fiction for a steady state model to explore 
international spillovers. 26 
the world – their growth rate would be higher if they were isolated.  That is, a research 
intensive country would be better off ignoring the research done in other countries. 
According to Howitt’s variety interpretation of this model, this is because an 
isolated country’s growth rate would be given by  iR ii ks a σλ .  Its research intensity would no 
longer be spread out over the number of world varieties, but instead over the smaller 
number of the country’s own varieties.  Thus, when a country disengages, it no longer 
benefits from spillovers from research conducted by the rest of the world, but there is an 
important compensating gain that comes from the fact that variety – and therefore dilution – 
falls for the disengaging country.  Since there is no love of variety in Howitt’s model, a 
high research-intensity country would gain from disengagement.  By this logic, engagement 
could not be sustained among any set of asymmetric countries!  The higher  iR ii ks a countries 
would always prefer to disengage, leaving all countries isolated in equilibrium. 
We now turn to an alternative specification for world spillovers in which variety 
does not play such a crucial role.  The specification will exhibit several of the features we 
have been looking for: first, no scale effect of world population on the world’s growth rate; 
second, other things equal, larger countries contribute more to world prosperity than small 
countries do; and third, tapping into rest-of-world research does not require spreading 
research across more varieties.  We believe this is accomplished by adopting the 
formulation in Jones (1995): instead of dividing byL, the scale effect is avoided by 
introducing the assumption that advancing the world technology frontier gets harder as the 
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where  1 γ < .  In this setting, sustained growth in A* depends on a continuously rising 
population.  To see this, notice that we can restate (4.6) as follows: 
 27 
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This expression makes clear that  A g  is decreasing in  * A ; as mentioned above, this is what 
is going to eliminate the scale effect.  Since all of the terms in the summation on the right-














One criticism of this specification is that  A g  does not depend on  R s , hence policy-
induced increases in research intensity would not increase the world’s growth rate (Howitt, 
1999).  As Jones (2002) argues, however, research intensity has been increasing over the 
last decades without a concomitant increase in the growth rate, so it is far from clear that we 
want a model where  A g  depends on  R s .
13 
An interesting and relevant feature of the model presented by Eaton and Kortum 
(1996) is that it allows for spillovers to differ between pairs of countries.  We can introduce 
this feature in the model by doing two things: first, we allow each country to have a 
different technology frontier,
*
i A ; second, we add country-pair specific spillover 
parameters, il η , to (4.6) so that now: 
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This formulation implies that there will no longer be a world technology frontier in the way 
it existed in model (J).  However, it proves useful for the analysis to introduce a new 
concept, which we will denote by  A   and which could be understood as the “frictionless 
technology frontier.”  To define this concept, note that if spillovers were the same among 
                                                           
13 Even though research intensity does not affect the growth rate, it can have sizable effects on welfare, 
particularly when – as evidence suggests – the social rate of return of research is significantly higher than the 
private rate of return. 28 
all country pairs ( 1 il η =  for all i and l) – a case we could interpret as frictionless – then 
countries would have a common technology frontier: 
**
il A A =  for all i and l.  We define  A   
so that in this case ( 1 il η =  for all i and l) 
*
i A A =   for all i.  As we will see below, in steady 
state  A   grows at the same rate as 
*
i A  for all i.  Letting 
* / ii zA A ≡  , which captures the 
strength of spillovers from the rest of the world to country i, we arrive at the following 
steady state restriction: 
 
(JEK)  ()
1 * (/) A ii l R l l l l i l
l




= ∑  
 
 
where JEK stands for Jones, Eaton and Kortum and where  l a  is now country l’s technology 
level relative to its own technology frontier: 
* / ll l aA A ≡ .  It can be shown that this implies 
the following restriction for  A  : 
 
(4.8) 
1/(1 ) () Av L
γ − =   
 
where ( / ) A lR ll l
l
vgk s a σ λω ≡ ∑ .  It is clear that each country’s technology frontier and  A   
will grow at the same rate as  * A  did in model (J), given by  /(1 ) L g γ − . 
  It is interesting to pause here to discuss the model’s implications regarding the 
effect of country size on productivity.  Imagine, to simplify, that all countries are the same 
except for size, and assume that  1 = ij η  for  j i =  and  1 < =η ηij  for  j i ≠ . Then it is easy 
to show that  j i z z >  if  j i ω ω > ; larger countries are more productive.  Intuitively, larger 
countries benefit more from spillovers because more of the world’s research takes place 
within their borders.  As long as borders discretely reduce spillovers, larger countries will 
capture more spillovers and enjoy higher productivity.  
The next step is to impose some restrictions on the international spillover 
parameters il η ’s.  The literature has allowed international spillovers to depend on trade (Coe 
and Helpman, 1995), distance (Eaton and Kortum, 1996), and other variables such as FDI 29 
flows (Caves, 1996).  Here we focus on the simplest approach, which is to assume that the 
parameters  il η  are completely determined by distance.  (This would capture trade and FDI 




− = , 
where d(i,l) is bilateral distance between countries i and l, and θ  is some positive 
parameter.  This model collapses to (J) if  0 θ = . 
This completes our discussion of different ways to model international spillovers.  
Table 6 summarizes the discussion in this subsection. 
 
4C. Determinants of R&D investment 
We mentioned above that there are two ways to motivate the model we presented in 
subsection 4A.  First, we can think of a model like the one presented in Howitt (2000), 
where research leads to improvements in the quality of capital goods, and population 
growth leads to an expansion in the total number of varieties available.  Second, research 
may be carried out by firms to increase their own productivity, as in Parente and Prescott 
(1994).  We pursue this second approach because it is simpler and much more convenient 
for our calibration purposes later on. 
As in Parente and Prescott (1994), we assume a constraint on the amount of labor 
firms can hire.  In particular, we assume that firms can hire no more than F workers.  To 
simplify notation, we set F = 1.  This constraint can be motivated as a limitation on the span 
of control by managers, as in Lucas (1978).
14  Output produced by firm j in country i at 
time t, which we denote by  jit Y , is given by 
1 () jit jit jit i YK A h
α α − = .  (We now use time 
subscripts because they clarify the maximization problem below.)  The firm can convert 
output into consumption, investment goods or R&D according to  jit jit i jit jit YCp IR = ++ , 
and the firm’s capital stock evolves according to  jit jit jit KI K δ =−  .  Finally, the firm’s 
technology index  jit A  evolves according to: 
 
(4.9)  () ( )
* (1 ) 1 / jit jit it jit jit it AR R A A A µλ µ λ ε =− + + −   
 
                                                           
14 If one takes F = 1 literally, then the externalities are in the human capital investment of individual workers. 30 
 
whereµ  is a parameter between zero and one,  it R  is the average of  jit R  across firms in 
country i (we use the bar over the variable to emphasize that this is the average across 
firms, and not the aggregate economy-wide variable), and 
*
it A  is the technology frontier for 
country i  with 
** / it it A A Ag =   for all i in steady state. 
  There are two features in this specification that merit some explanation.  First, the 
“benefits of backwardness” are determined by the term 
* 1/ jit it A A − , which can differ across 
firms in country i:  a more backward firm in country i would have a higher catch-up term.  
If instead we specified the catch-up term as
* 1/ it it A A −  (where it A  is the average technology 
index across firms in country i), then there would be a negative externality because, as a 
firm does more research, it increases the country’s average technology index and decreases 
the catch-up term for the other firms.  Given that there is no particular reason to think that 
this negative externality is a relevant feature to include in the model, we have chosen to 
specify the catch-up term as 
* 1/ jit it A A − .  Second, there is a positive research externality 
across firms within each country, represented by the term  it R µλ .  This externality captures 
the idea that a firm benefits directly from research undertaken by other firms within the 
same economy. 
To relate this to what we had in subsection 4A, note that if firms within a country 
are identical, then  jit it R R =  and  jit it A A = .  Using this in (4.9), we obtain: 
 
  ( )( )
* 1/ it it it it it AR AA A λε =+ −   
 
 
But note that  it it AA =  and  / it it it R RL = , where  it L  is the total labor force in country i and 
also the number of firms there, given our assumptions above.  Using these results and 
noting that  / Ri it it sR Y = we obtain equation (4.2). 31 
  Firms in country i pay taxes at rate  Ki τ  on capital income (output less the wage bill) 
,and there is an R&D tax (or subsidy, if it is negative) of  Ri τ .
15  We stress that this R&D tax 
parameter does not have to be interpreted strictly as a formal tax or subsidy; when positive, 
the R&D tax parameter  Ri τ  could also be interpreted as capturing “barriers to technology 
adoption”, as in Parente and Prescott (1994).
16 
The firm’s dynamic optimization problem is to choose a path for Rjis and  jis I  to 
maximize 
 
  ( )
() (1 ) (1 )
rst
Ki jis is i jis Ri jis t Yw p I R e d s ττ
∞ −− ⎡⎤ −− − − + ⎣⎦ ∫  
 
 
subject to  jis jis jis KI K δ =−  , 
** // is is is is A AA AA g = =  , and 
 
  () ( )
* (1 ) 1 / jis jis is jis jis is AR R A A A µλ µ λ ε =− + + −   
 
As shown in the Appendix, by imposing the symmetry condition on the two Euler equations 

































                                                           
15 We should note here that the tax rate on capital income also affects the incentive to do research.  The 
notation used for the two tax rates is meant to emphasize that  Ki τ  affects all forms of accumulation by the 
firm, whereas  Ri τ  only affects research expenditures. 
16 We assume that any tax revenue collected is distributed back to consumers in lump-sum fashion. 32 
Equation (4.10) defines the equilibrium capital-output ratio in country i and 
equation (4.11) implicitly defines the equilibrium relative A in country i.  Given  i a  and 
knowing  i k  from the data, we can plug their values into equation (4.3) to obtain the 
equilibrium steady state R&D investment rate,  Ri s .  It is easy to see that an increase in the 
capital income tax or the R&D tax or an increase in the externality parameter,µ , would 
decrease  i Ω  and hence lead to a decline in equilibrium  i a  (this is because the left-hand side 
of (4.11) is decreasing in  i a ).  This, of course, would imply a decline in the R&D 
investment rate.  The same reasoning shows that  i a  is increasing in  i k  but it is not 
necessarily the case that  Ri s  increases with  i k  (see the Appendix). 
Combining the result for the social rate of return in equation (4.5) with (4.11), we 








The first term on the right-hand side is the distortion created by Ω, which captures the 
effect of the income tax,  K τ , the R&D tax,  R τ , and the externality parameter, µ .  If there 
are no taxes and  0 µ =  (no domestic R&D externalities), then  1 i Ω =  and the wedge 




The model described in the previous section, together with the (JEK) formulation 




− = , constitutes the model we calibrate in this 
subsection.  Since we will only be working with the symmetric steady state equilibrium, in 
this subsection we suppress time and firm subscripts to simplify notation.  Given N 
                                                           
17 As explained above,  L g  is associated with a positive externality because new firms start up with the same 
productivity as existing firms.  Since the number of firms is equal to the workforce, the value of ideas and the 
social rate of return are increasing in  L g . 33 
countries, the steady state equilibrium is given by { i K , i Y , i k , i a , i R s , i A ,
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where the last equation comes from (JEK) together with (4.8).  
  If we knew the relevant parameters and tax rates and wanted to solve for an 
equilibrium, we would first start by solving for  A g  from equation (4.13).  Given data for 
exogenous variables  i h ,  i p  and  Ki τ  we could then calculate equilibrium  i k  using  (4.14) 
and (4.15).  Together with  A g  and parameterε , equation (4.16) would yield  i a .  From 
(4.17) we would then obtain  Ri s .  Up to this point, there is no interaction across countries, 
so these results do not depend on geography or θ ; this dimension becomes relevant in 
obtaining actual productivity levels, because they depend on the variables  i z , which capture 
spillovers from the rest of the world to country i.  To see how this operates, note that given 34 
the value of θ , equation (4.22) configures a system of N equations (where N is the number 
of countries) in N unknowns ( 12 , ,  ...  N zz z ).  The solution to this system determines  i z .  
Given parameter σ , equation (4.20) determines  A  , which together with  i z  determines each 
country’s technology frontier 
*
i A  (equation (4.19)).  Finally, from equation (4.18), a 
country’s technology frontier together with its relative A level  i a  determines  i A . 
For the calibration exercise, the first step is to specify the variables we observe and 
how they relate to the model.  We take human capital to be 
* i MYS
i he
ϕ = , where  i MYS  is 
mean years of schooling of the adult population in country i, obtained from Barro and Lee 
(2000).  We use R&D data from Lederman and Sáenz (2003).  The 48 countries in our 
sample are the ones for which there is R&D data for 1995, as well as the necessary TFP and 
capital intensity variables described in section 3.  The first two columns of Table A1 
reproduce the values of the R&D investment rate and the value of A for the 48 countries in 
our sample. 
For the basic parameters we use the following values:  0.085 ϕ = ,1 / 3 α = , 
0.08 δ = , 0.011 L g =  and  0.015 A g = .  For the first three, see our discussion in section 3.  
The last two (the growth rates) were obtained from OECD average growth rates of L and A 
for the period 1960-2000.
18  Using (4.13), the values for the two growth rates imply 
0.31 γ = .  To calculate the net private rate of return, r, which we assume to be common 
across countries, we take the capital income tax in the U.S. to be 25% ( , 0.25 KU S τ = ).
19  
Given the 1995 U.S. nominal capital-output ratio of 1.5 (see section 3 for how we 
constructed capital-output ratios), this implies from (4.14) that  8.6% r = .  Given this level 
for r, we then use equation (4.14) together with country nominal capital-output ratios to 
obtain each country’s implicit income tax  Ki τ . 
Remaining parameters we must calibrate are ε , λ , µ  and θ .  Unfortunately, there 
is no empirical work that we can rely on to pin down ε .  Thus, we choose a value for  
                                                           
18 Specifically, the growth rate of A is the annual growth rate of the weighted average of A in the OECD with 
weights given by employment levels in 1960. OECD membership is defined by 1975 status. 
19 Auerbach (1996) estimates an effective tax rate in the U.S. of about 16%, but King and Fullerton (1984) 
estimate a much higher level of around 35%.  We use 25% as an intermediate value. 35 
ε  based on the following reasoning.  First, ε  cannot be much higher than  A g .  This is 
because for  0 R ks ≥  equation (4.17) implies that  1 / A ag ε ≥− .  Thus, a high value of ε  
would imply that some countries’ relative empirical A becomes lower than the theoretical 
minimum 1 / A g ε − .  In other words, if free technology diffusion is too important, then it 
would be hard to account for countries with very low A levels.  Second, if  A g ε < , then 
countries with a low value of  R ks  ( RA sk g λ ε < − ) would not be able to keep up with the 
world’s rate of growth in technology, so they would not have a steady state relative A level.  
(Consistent with stable long run relative income levels, Figure 3 showed roughly parallel 
slopes for average income across deciles over 1960-2000, with each decile based on 1960 
income.)  Thus, it seems reasonable to impose the intermediate condition that  A g ε = .  We 
believe, however, that future empirical work should attempt to understand the importance 
of free technology diffusion captured by parameter ε . 
Given this choice for ε , we use two empirical findings to pin down parameters λ  
and  , µ  namely that the social rate of return to R&D in the U.S. is three times the net private 
rate of return (Griliches, 1992) and that the U.S. imposes a subsidy of 20% on R&D (Hall 
and Van Reenen, 2000), implying that  , 0.2 RU S τ = − .  Given data for  R s  and k for the U.S. in 
1995 ( 2.5% RUS s =  and  3.6 US k = ), then this restriction together with equation (4.17) 
implies 0.7 US a =  and  0.38 λ = .
20  From (4.16) we then obtain  0.55 µ = .   
A parameter remaining to calibrate is θ .
21  Before discussing possible values for 
this parameter, it is useful to consider the case where  0 θ =  – so that there is no effect of 
distance on international spillovers – and to compare the implications of the model to the 
data.  Using the R&D investment rate data of Lederman and Saenz (2003) and our 
                                                           
20 Due to the non-linearity of the expression for the social rate of return to R&D, there are actually two values 
of λ  which are compatible with a social rate of return equal to 26% (three times the private rate of return). 
The higher value ofλ , however, would imply a high relative A level for the U.S. and consequently – given 
measured A for the U.S. – a value for A* that would be lower than the measured A levels of the high A 
countries, such as Hong Kong and Italy. To avoid this, we choose the lower value ofλ . 
21 We must also set a value for σ , which is crucial for determining the level of  A  .  We use the value of 
US A  
obtained from the data, (4.18)-(4.20), 0.7 US a = , and a value for  US z  (equal to one when  0 θ =  and a known 
value from the solution to the above system of equations for the case  0 θ > ) to arrive at a value for σ . 36 
estimated k levels, equation (4.17) yields the model’s implied relative A level for each 
country (ai).  We want to compare this against the data.  To do so, we use the value of A we 
calculated for the U.S. in the previous section and  0.7 US a =  to obtain an implied value for 
the world technology frontier, A* (recall that with  0 θ =  there is a well defined technology 
frontier that is common to all countries).  We can then obtain the model’s implied A values 
for all countries using  * ii Aa A = .  The result of this exercise is shown in Table 7, where we 
divide countries into four groups according to their levels of A and show the median of the 
different variables for each group.  It is clear that the model does badly for the poorest 
countries, predicting much lower A levels for them than occur in the data.  This discrepancy 
does not occur for the richest countries, so the model is predicting significantly larger A 
differences than in the data.  For example, whereas (according to the data) the top group’s 
median A is 3.4 times the median A of the bottom group, the model implies a ratio of 5.6. 
The model implies large differences in productivity in response to small differences 
in R&D investment rates.  As is well known, the neoclassical model – with only around 1/3 
share for physical capital – cannot generate large differences in steady state labor 
productivity in response to modest differences in investment rates (see the discussion in 
Lucas, 1990).  It is worth pausing here to explore some of the reasons behind these 
divergent properties.  Manipulating the neoclassical model, one can show that the semi-











With the values we used above ( 1/3 α = ,  0.08 δ = , 0.011 L g =  and  0.015 A g = ), (4.23) 
yields a semi-elasticity of only 1.22% when evaluated at  8.6% r = .  Thus large differences 
in investment rates would be required to generate sizable differences in labor productivity 
across countries.  Two differences between the way the R&D investment rate operates in 
our model and the way the physical capital investment rate operates in the neoclassical 
model stand out: first, the depreciation rate of ideas in our model is zero versus  0.08 δ =  
for capital in the neoclassical model; second, the elasticity of output with respect to the 
stock of ideas can exceed 1/3 (we have it at 2/3).  To see the importance of these values, 37 
note that with  2/3 α =  the semi-elasticity doubles to 2.46% (still with 8.6% r = ).  If we use 
0 δ =  as well, then the semi-elasticity increases to 9.6%.  In our model, the combined share 
of physical capital and ideas is actually 1.  Without the constraint of the world technology 
frontier, therefore, the long run response of output would be infinite. 
It is important to recall that the results shown in Table 7 and discussed above were 
derived for the case of  0 θ = .  Is it possible that a positive value of θ  could improve the 
model’s fit with the data?  As will become clear below, countries with high levels of k and 
high R&D investment rates tend to cluster together.  Thus, assuming a positive value for θ  
would actually make the model less consistent with the data, since it would imply an even 
larger difference between A levels across rich and poor countries. 
One possible reason why the model is not doing well in matching the data is that 
measured R&D is not the appropriate empirical counterpart of “research” in the type of 
models we have been examining.  In particular, measured R&D only includes formal 
research; this is research performed in an R&D department of a corporation or other 
institution.  This fails to capture informal research, which may be particularly important in 
non-OECD countries.  To explore this idea, in the rest of this section we assume that both 
R&D intensity and the productivity index A are measured with error.  We estimate “true” 
R&D intensities by minimizing a loss function equal to the sum of two terms that capture, 
respectively, the deviation of the “true” R&D intensities from the data and the deviation of 
the model’s implied (log of) A values from the data, with weights given by the standard 
deviation of the corresponding differences.
22  In principle, we could follow this procedure 
for each value of θ .  However, at  0 θ = , the partial derivative of our loss function with 
respect to θ  is positive and large, implying that – just as argued above – the model’s fit 
with the data worsens as θ  increases from zero.  Thus, we restrict ourselves to estimating 
R&D intensities for  0 θ =  and later show what happens if, keeping the same R&D 
intensities estimated for  0 θ = , we have positive values of θ . 
                                                           
22 We do this in two stages.  In the first stage we minimize a loss function without weights.  We use the results 
to calculate the standard deviation of the error terms, or differences between data and “true” values for both 
R&D intensity and productivity.  In the second stage we minimize the loss function with weights given by 
these calculated standard deviations. 38 
It should be acknowledged that this procedure obviously implies that we can no 
longer evaluate the model’s consistency with the data; our interest is now to explore the 
implications of the model for the differences in R&D investment rates that would be 
necessary to explain cross-country differences in A, as well as the implied differences in 
R&D tax rates that would be necessary to bring about those R&D investment rates. 
The results of the exercise described above are shown in Figure 4 and Table A1 
(columns 3 and 4).  There are three points to note from these results.  First, it is clear that 
the procedure leads to only small deviations of A from the data, whereas the deviations are 
more significant for R&D intensities.  It would appear that R&D intensities have more 
significant measurement problems (or are conceptually more different than research 
intensity in our model) than productivity levels.  Indeed, the standard deviation of residuals 
of  R s  with respect to the data is 0.12, whereas the corresponding value for the (log of) A is 
0.01.
23  Second, there are some countries for which the estimated R&D intensity is much 
higher than the data.  Italy, for example, has a measured R&D intensity of 1.1%, whereas 
its “true” value is 8.3%.  This arises because of Italy’s high measured productivity (Italy’s 
A is 24% higher than the U.S. level) and low value of k (2.6 versus 3.6 in the U.S.).  
Something similar happens for other high-A countries, such as Hong Kong and Ireland.  
Finally, just as one would expect given the results above, estimated R&D intensities vary 
much less than the corresponding values in the data.  This is the main mechanism by which 
the procedure allows the model to fit perfectly.  It also suggests that measurement error may 
be behind the low R&D intensities of several poor countries and of some high A countries 
such as Italy, Ireland and Hong Kong.   
We can now explore what happens when θ  is positive, so that spillovers decline 
with distance.  Given the estimated R&D intensities, productivity levels change with θ  
only because of the associated changes in the variables z , which capture the effect of 
distance on spillovers for each country.  In principle, we can obtain the values of 
( 12 4 8 , ,  ...  zz z) for any  0 θ ≥  from the solution of a system of 48 non-linear equations 
represented by (4.22).  Equation i of this system can be expressed as: 
                                                           
23 These standard deviations are the ones that arise after the two stage procedure described in the previous 





























Solving this system numerically for the parameter values we have discussed and the R&D 
intensities derived before, we arrive at a value of  i z  for each country, from which we can 
then obtain the country’s level of A by using  ii i Aa z A =   from (4.18) and (4.19). 
What are reasonable values to use for the parameter θ ?  Using industry level data 
on productivity and research spending across the G-5 countries, Keller (2002) estimated a 
reduced form model where cumulative industry research affects own productivity and also 
affects productivity in the same industry in other countries through international spillovers 
that decline with distance.
24  Given the similarity between Keller’s system and a reduced 
form of our model, it seems reasonable to use Keller’s estimate of θ , namely  0.0009 K θ ≡  
in the calibration of our model.  It turns out, however, that with  K θ θ =  our model cannot 
match the data – in particular, there is no solution to the system of equations (4.24), at least 
for the parameters used for the exercises above.  This is because  K θ  is unreasonably high.  
One way to see this is by noting that it implies a half distance of 746 miles: this implies that 
spillovers from the U.S. to Japan would be only one tenth of those to Mexico, and 
spillovers from the U.S. to New Zealand would be only one fifth of those to Japan. 
  We were able to find solutions for the system with  /5 K θ θ = .  For comparison, we 
also obtained solutions for two other values of θ , namely  /10 K θ θ =  and  /100 K θ θ = .  A 
group of European countries (Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
and Netherlands) always come out with the highest values of  z , whereas New Zealand 
always comes out with the lowest value.  For  /100 K θ θ = , /10 K θ θ =  and  /5 K θ θ = , the 
minimum and maximum values of z  are (93%, 96%), (48%, 68%) and (24%, 50%), 
respectively.  Clearly, for high values of θ , geography by itself can lead to large 
differences in productivity across countries. 
                                                           
24 For other estimates of international spillovers from R&D, see Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman 
and Hoffmaister (1997).  For a study of agricultural R&D spillovers, see Evenson and Gollin (2003).  Becker, 
Philipson and Soares (2003) present evidence consistent with international spillovers of health technology. 40 
In the rest of this section, we focus on the case  0 θ = , since – as explained above – 
the model’s fit with the data is best at this point.  (Recall that the model fits perfectly 
because we are using the estimated research intensities and the implied A values).  Table 8 
presents summary statistics for the solution for the case of  0 θ = .  Our discussion of these 
results will focus on the comparison of the poorest and richest quartiles (ordered, as above, 
in terms of A levels) in this table. 
There are several points that we want to highlight in relation to these results.  First, 
the median income tax is 13% and 6% for the poorest and richest countries, respectively.  
Everything else equal, this would lead to a lower R&D investment rate in the poorest 
countries.  Second, as expected, rich countries have a higher k than poor countries: the level 
of k in these two groups is 2 and 2.9, respectively.  As commented in Section 4B, higher k 
has a direct effect on relative A (see equation (4.17)) and an indirect effect (it could be 
positive or negative) through its impact on R&D investment rates (see equation (4.16)).  A 
natural question arises: is it the case that once we take into account the effect of k on TFP 
we can resuscitate the “neoclassical revolution” mantra that differences in physical and 
human capital accumulation rates account for most of cross-country income differences?  
More concretely, how much of the variation in A levels across countries is due to the 
variation in levels of k?  A simple way to answer this question is to note from equation 
(4.17) that differences in relative A levels are driven by differences in the product  R sk 
across countries.  Running a regression of   R s  on the log of this product yields a coefficient 
of 0.8, which implies that when  R sk  increases by one percent, we should expect  R s  to 
increase by 0.8%.  Clearly, most of the variance of the product  R sk  is accounted for by the 
variance of  R s .   
Third, the social return to R&D is higher for poor countries.  This is consistent with 
the findings in Lederman and Maloney (2003) and also with the idea that poor countries 
have policies and institutions that negatively affect the quantity of research.   
Fourth, the column with heading  R τ  indicates the R&D tax rate required to produce 
the “true” R&D investment rates given each country’s levels of  K τ .  The main question we 
address here is whether differences in income tax rates, which affect both the rate of 41 
investment in physical capital and R&D, are sufficient to explain differences in estimated 
research intensities.  The answer is clearly negative: the required R&D tax rate in the 
poorest countries is 102% compared to -16% in the richest countries.  To address the same 
question from a different angle, the last column calculates each country’s implied relative A 
level if all countries had the same R&D tax as the U.S. but kept their own levels of  K τ .  It 
is clear that differences in  K τ  alone are too small to account for the wide dispersion in 
productivity levels across countries. 
Finally, as emphasized above, the results in Table 8 suggest that small differences in 
steady-state R&D investment rates have large effects on steady state relative A levels.  For 
example, in the calibrated model, by increasing its R&D investment rate by 1% from 0.6% 
India could double its steady state relative A level from 17% to 34%, clearly a very large 
effect.  India’s social rate of return to research, however, is a moderate 30%.  The apparent 
contradiction arises because the large effect of the increase in the R&D intensity on the 
relative A level is a steady-state comparative-statics result, and hence does not take into 
account the transition, which is a crucial component in the calculation of the social rate of 
return to R&D. As a result, in spite of the large effect of differences in R&D investment 
rates on relative A levels in steady state, the required implicit taxes on R&D are not huge. 
 
4E. The benefits of engagement 
One of the benefits of the model we have constructed is that it allows us to perform 
an interesting exercise.  We can ask: how much do countries benefit from spillovers from 
the rest of the world? 
First, note that a country’s equilibrium  i a  is not affected by being isolated or 
engaged.  Thus, the whole benefit of engagement is going to captured by the way 
engagement affects the term  i z .  Now, if a country is isolated, or disengaged, its 
equilibrium z  would be characterized by the solution to the system (4.24) when θ →∞.  It 
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The first term on the RHS of this equation,  i z , captures the fact that even when fully 
engaged, a country’s technology frontier is inferior to the world’s frictionless frontier if 
0 θ > , in which case  1 i z <  for all i.  The second term is the pure scale effect that arises in 
this model.  The third term, which we call the “Silicon Valley” effect, captures the fact that 
richer countries benefit less from being part of the world than poor countries do because of 
their higher effective research intensity. 
Table 9 presents results based on these values and assuming  0 θ = , which implies 
1 i z =  for all i.  The results suggest huge benefits of engagement.  At the extreme, Senegal’s 
productivity is 187 thousand times higher than it would be if it was isolated!  Of course, if 
0 θ >  then  1 i z <  and the overall effect would be small.  Still, it is our conjecture that any 
reasonable value of θ  would still imply enormous benefits of engagement.  Of course, in a 
more general model, it is reasonable to think that productivity could not fall below a certain 
level because of Malthusian forces.  Specifically, suppose there is a fixed factor such as 
land.  Then, for sufficiently low A, population would decline until income per capita was 
equal to the subsistence level.  Instead of very low levels of A, disengagement would mean 43 
very low population sizes.  Put differently, an important part of the benefits of engagement 
may be realized through larger population rather than higher productivity.  The implications 
are clear: if it were not for the benefits of sharing knowledge internationally, countries 
would have much lower productivity levels and populations than they now do. 
 
4F. Discussion of main results 
We finish this section with a discussion of the main results we want to emphasize. 
First, the usual separation between capital and productivity – or between investment 
and technological change – is not always valid.  For a given R&D investment rate, higher 
investment rates in physical and human capital lead naturally to higher TFP productivity 
levels.  Thus, one should not jump from cross-country dispersion in TFP to the conclusion 
that differences in physical and human capital play a minority role in accounting for 
international income differences.  When we calibrate our model, however, we find that 
differences in R&D investment rates account for most of the cross country variation in 
productivity. 
  Second, international variation in R&D investment appears more than large enough 
to generate the international variation in productivity.  But it seems likely that measured 
R&D does not capture all of the investment associated with adoption of foreign technology.  
Indeed, we find that countries such as Indonesia, Peru and Senegal have R&D investment 
rates that are much too low to be consistent with their productivity levels.  It is likely that 
their true research intensities are much higher than the measured ones.  We hope to see 
more research in understanding how to capture and measure “research”. 
  Third, differences in (implicit) capital income tax rates are not large enough to 
account for the observed differences in R&D investment rates and productivity levels.  The 
calibrated model suggests that sizable differences in R&D taxes are needed.  These R&D 
taxes are clearly not formal or explicit taxes, but the result of policies and institutions that 
make research more costly or reduce its associated returns.  Exploring the nature and source 
of these differences in implicit R&D taxes across countries is an important topic for future 
research. 44 
Finally and most importantly, the calibrated model indicates that countries benefit 
enormously from international knowledge spillovers.  We think any reasonable value of θ  
(which governs the rate at which spillovers decline with distance) would yield results 
similar to those we presented above. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Externalities are not theoretically necessary to sustain growth.  But they appear 
essential for understanding why many countries grow at similar rates despite differing 
investment rates.  A dramatic way to summarize the importance of international knowledge 
externalities is to calculate world GDP in the absence of such externalities.  According to 
our calibrated model, world GDP would be only 6% of its current level, or on the order of 
$3 trillion rather than $50 trillion, if countries did not share ideas.  Such scale effects from 
the nonrivalry of knowledge are a central theme in the works of Romer (1990), Kremer 
(1993), Diamond (1997), Jones (2001, 2004) and many others. 
Because diffusion is not costless, however, differences in knowledge investments 
may explain a significant portion of income differences across countries.  We show that 
modest barriers to technology adoption could account for differences in TFP of a factor of 
four or more, as observed in the data.  But we have not documented such barriers to 
knowledge diffusion in practice.  We consider this a priority for future research. 
We have also left for future research the identification of the primary channels of 
international knowledge spillovers.  Trade, joint ventures, FDI, migration of key personnel, 
and imitation may all play important roles.  See Keller (2004) for a survey of recent 
empirical work on this topic.  A model with trade would lead naturally to some countries 
having a comparative advantage in doing innovative R&D and other countries focusing on 
adoption and imitation R&D.  The evidence on international patenting supports the notion 
that innovative R&D is concentrated in rich countries.  Of course, countries can imitate 
other imitators as well as the original innovators.  We hope to see future research 
documenting not only the vehicles for knowledge diffusion, but their specific routes. 45 
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Letting Q represent the expression in the integral, then we know that a solution to this 
problem must satisfy the following Euler Equations:  /( / )
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Since in a symmetric equilibrium the capital-output ratio of firm j is the same as the 
aggregate capital output ratio, then this implies that: 
 











As to the second Euler equation, differentiation yields (we are using the symmetry 
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Thus, the Euler equation is: 
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Noting that in a symmetric equilibrium we must have  // jis jis is is is i YA Y A Lk = = , and 
manipulating, we get: 


















(From here onwards we drop the subscripts).  It is easy to show that ais increasing 
in both Ω and k .  In particular: 
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Summing on the RHS and noting that the denominator is clearly positive we get that 
/0 sk ∂∂ > if and only if: 
 (1 ) ( /(1 ))(1 1/(1 )) A sg a a s α εε Ω− − − + − −  
This could well be negative!47 
Table 1 
 
Some Growth Models by Type of Externality 
 
 
    
New Good Externalities 
 
 








Stokey 1988 & 1991 
Romer 1990 
Aghion and Howitt 1992 
Eaton and Kortum 1996 




Lucas 1988 & 2004 
Tamura 1991 





















Jones and Manuelli 1990 
Rebelo 1991 









































                  
World      2.7%    1.1%  96      15.8%     15.5%  96      7.1%    9.7%  74 
                  
OECD 3.4  1.8  23    23.2  22.9  23    11.4  14.3  21 
                  
Non-OECD 2.5  0.9  73    13.5  13.2  73    5.4  8.0  53 
                  
Africa 2.0  0.5  38    12.3  10.5  38    3.9  6.0  19 
Asia 3.2  2.8  17    14.5  19.9  17    6.9  9.9  16 
Europe 3.8  1.9  18    24.9  23.1  18    10.7  13.7  16 
North  America  2.8 0.4 13    14.3  14.5 13    7.5 10.2 13 
South America  2.3   -0.1x 10    17.3 15.0  10    7.1  9.8  10 
                  
1
st quartile (poorest)  1.6  0.5  24    9.6  9.9  24    3.1  5.0  19 
2
nd quartile  2.6  1.4  24    14.8  14.2  24    5.7  8.9  19 
3
rd  quartile  3.5 1.1 24    15.4  16.3 24    7.5 10.3 18 
4
th quartile (richest)  3.0  1.5  24    23.6  21.9  24    12.3  15.1  18 
                    
 
Notes:  Y/L is GDP per worker.  sI  is the physical capital investment rate, and sH  years of schooling attainment (for the 25+ 
population) divided by 60 years (working life).  Data Sources: Barro and Lee (2000) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). 49 
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1980-2000 vs. 1960-1980 
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Notes:  World = 74 countries with available data; OECD = 22 countries; and non-OECD = 52 
countries.  Decades consisted of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  All variables are averages over 
the indicated periods.  Each entry is from a single regression.  Bold entries indicate p-values of 1% 
or less.  Data Sources:  Barro and Lee (2000) and Penn World Table 6.1 (Heston, Summers and 
Aten, 2002). 50 
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All countries  .111 
(.017) 
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2 = .48 
96   .210 
(.060) 
R




2 = .67 
74 








2 = .18 
23       -.259 x 
(.078) 
R




2 = .56 
21 
            
Non-OECD  .124 
(.023) 
R




2 = .28 
73   .367 
(.095) 
R




2 = .51 
53 
              
 
Notes:  Variables are averages over 1960-2000.  Each entry is from a single regression.  Bold entries 
indicate p-values of 1% or less.  Data Sources:  Barro and Lee (2000) and Penn World Table 6.1 




R&D Intensity Also Correlates More with Levels than Growth Rates 
 
   




























              
All countries  0.40 
(0.59) 
R




2 = .10 
82   0.43 
(0.52) 
R




2 = .27 
67 
              
OECD   -0.15x 
(0.46) 
R




2 = .45 
21    -0.16 x 
(0.32) 
R




2 = .28 
21 








2 = .03 
61   0.85 
(1.01) 
R




2 = .12 
46 
                
 
Notes: Variables are country averages over years in 1960-2000 with data relative to time effects.  Y/L is GDP per 
worker.  TFP nets out contributions from human and physical capital, as described in the text.  Each entry is from a 
single regression.  Bold entries indicate p-values of 2% or less.  Data Sources:  Barro and Lee (2000), Penn World 
Table 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002), and Lederman and Saenz (2003). 52 
Table 6 
 
Alternative Ways of Modeling International Spillovers 
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The model takes into 
account effect of distance 
on spillovers. 
We will find it hard to see the 
cost of geographic isolation in 





Model A versus data A ( 0 θ =  case) 
 
 
Country  Data k   Data  R s   Data A Model  A 
Quartile 1  2.0 0.4%  4,478  2,184 
Quartile 2  2.5 0.5%  9,574  5,358 
Quartile 3  3.1 1.7%  11,111  11,763 







Implied R&D tax rates 
 
 
Country  K τ   k  
“True” 
R s   a  SRR  R τ  
a for 
, Ri R US τ τ =
Quartile  1 13%  2.0  0.60% 20%  42% 102% 58% 
Quartile  2 0%  2.5 1.13%  43% 37% 93% 68% 
Quartile  3 4%  3.1 1.97%  50% 29% 31% 72% 
Quartile 4  6%  2.9  2.98%  70%  21%  -16%  70% 
 
 
Notes:  R τ  is calculated as the level of  R τ  needed to generate the “true” research intensity.  For each 
country, we use its own implied income tax level ( K τ ) and its own capital intensity level k .  The last 
column presents the equilibrium steady state relative A level (a ) for the hypothetical case in which all 
countries have the same R&D tax as the U.S. ( , Ri R US τ τ = ) but have different income tax rates and 




Benefits of Engagement for Selected Countries 
 
 
Country  Share of world’s L Scale  Effect  S.V.  Effect Total  Effect 
        
U.S. 7.1%  37  0.12  5 
        
U.K. 1.5%  297  0.21  64 
        
Belgium 0.2%  4,093  0.12 480 
        
Brazil 3.1%  114  0.97  110 
        
India 1.3%  9  23.0  217 
        
China 38.7%  4  70.6  258 
       
Senegal 0.2%  4,451  42.0  187,035 55 
 
Figure 1:  OECD Incomes Correlate Negatively










1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 data on 23 OECD Countries
Correlation(investment rate, log GDP per worker)
Correlation(growth rate, log GDP per worker)56 
Figure 2:  OECD Incomes Correlate Negatively
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Sources: Penn World Table 6.1 and Barro and Lee (2000) data for 21 OECD countries.
Correlation(schooling attainment, log GDP per worker)
Correlation(growth rate, lagged log GDP per worker)
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Figure 4: Deviations of the model from the data 
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Table A1: Data and “true” values for research intensity and productivity 
 
Country   Data sR  Data A  “True” sR  Implied A 
Argentina  0.41% 9,720 1.21% 9,719 
Bolivia  0.37% 4,672 0.74% 4,672 
Brazil  0.86% 9,836 1.67% 9,835 
Chile  0.61% 11,078 1.98% 11,075 
China  0.60% 2,570 0.28% 2,570 
Colombia  0.28% 8,143 1.54% 8,141 
Ecuador  0.08% 5,990 0.69% 5,990 
Egypt  2.11% 11,126 3.57% 11,119 
Hong  Kong  0.25% 17,874 5.49% 17,732 
Hungary  0.73% 7,172 0.63% 7,172 
Indonesia  0.09% 5,912 0.91% 5,911 
India  0.63% 3,755 0.60% 3,755 
Israel  2.75% 13,919 2.15% 13,922 
South  Korea  2.49% 8,842 0.71% 8,843 
Mexico  0.31% 8,781 1.08% 8,780 
Panama  0.38% 6,106 0.60% 6,106 
Peru  0.05% 4,285 0.40% 4,285 
Poland  0.69% 4,893 0.33% 4,893 
Romania  0.80% 2,757 0.16% 2,757 
Senegal  0.02% 3,069 0.64% 3,068 
Singapore  1.16% 13,592 2.16% 13,587 
El  Salvador  0.33% 11,096 3.26% 11,084 
Thailand  0.12% 5,212 0.49% 5,212 
Tunisia  0.32% 10,323 2.11% 10,319 
Taiwan  1.78% 14,944 3.59% 14,928 
Uganda  0.59% 2,878 1.02% 2,878 
Uruguay  0.28% 10,088 1.69% 10,085 
Venezuela  0.48% 9,427 1.35% 9,426 
Austria  1.56% 14,807 2.60% 14,800 
Belgium  1.57% 15,597 2.89% 15,586 
Canada  1.64% 11,614 1.12% 11,615 
Denmark  1.84% 13,678 1.95% 13,677 
Spain  0.81% 15,758 3.69% 15,726 
Finland  2.37% 10,358 0.94% 10,360 
France  2.31% 15,411 3.07% 15,404 
United  Kingdom  1.99% 13,954 2.35% 13,952 
Germany  2.25% 11,993 1.31% 11,994 
Greece  0.49% 10,046 1.07% 10,046 
Ireland  1.35% 17,177 5.08% 17,098 
Italy  1.08% 19,204 8.27% 18,795 
Japan  2.89% 9,864 0.85% 9,865 
Netherlands  1.99% 14,136 2.19% 14,135 
Norway  1.71% 10,990 0.88% 10,991 
New  Zealand  0.97% 9,911 0.85% 9,911 
Portugal  0.57% 13,230 2.65% 13,220 
Sweden  3.46% 10,416 0.91% 10,418 
Turkey  0.38% 7,800 1.18% 7,800 
USA  2.51% 15,472 2.51% 15,472 60 
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